The Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC)'s paper in the light of realities

President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on the wining stage
February 8, 2017

 

“Blessed are the young, for they will inherit the national debt” said Herbert Hoover. In my case, blessed are the young, for they inherited the divided nation. 

On February 08, 2017 Somalia’s 275 members of parliament and 54 senators elected a new president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo). It was a surprise election result that very few, if not none, expected. With the presence of serious corruption allegations which have been made against the election process and the lack of universal suffrage, no one could dare to speculate that a pure result will come out of the election process. However, when Farmajo was declared as the winner, his election victory, his clean record from any corruption scandals and his high-level popularity couldn’t add up in Somalia’s last 25 and more years known political culture. This is what made the election result surprise one and many could ask why the election of a candidate with all these electability qualities could rise and eyebrows? However, to answer this question is not the purpose of this piece of writing, rather the objective is to review and examine an expert report, “Somalia Elects New President”, written about the above-mentioned election and the country’s post-election possible scenarios published by CDRC (Center for Dialogue, Research, and Cooperation), a Think Tank institute based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February, 2017. 

In summary of its main arguments, CDRC makes many assertions about the past events and speculates possible challenges about the future. First, like everyone else, the center states “the result took many observers by surprise” without not explaining why it was so other than the corruption allegations and lack of the universal suffrage and it attributes Farmajo’s victory to a “significant support from young political elites.”  In addition to that, CDRC states that allegation of corruption, perceived foreign interference in the election process, and the security threat imposed by Al-shabab, a terrorist organization, turned down the incumbent’s bid for the presidency. Nevertheless, the center argues “last minute alliance and counter alliance played the biggest role.” With respect to the post-election challenges, the center gives huge weight to the clan diversities and the complexities of clan related politics. It asserts clan and sub-clan differences played the biggest role in past conflicts and political deadlocks and they will pose a similar threat if not properly addressed. Thus, the center warns that the past music of clan-based violence may be replayed again if the nascent administration fails to address clan interests in its policies towards restoring normalcy and nation rebuilding. Finally, the center urges the new administration to create a friendly relationship with the regional countries and balance the influence of none- regional powers in the light of regional considerations.

However, despite the tremendous speculations, unfortunately, most of the center’s assertions increase reader’s skepticism and don’t withstand with realities. First, center’s failure to answer the question of why the election result became a surprise one leaves readers in the middle of the road. It leaves one the risk to perceive that the president was elected through improper means. Moreover, center’s argument that “last minute alliance” determined the election outcome” with no credible evidence implies a desire to question the level of legitimacy and genuine support that new administration has.  Secondly, center’s argument that clan and sub-clan social cleavages among the Somalis have been and might become a big obstacle to peace and stability is an unreal and fallacious assertion. While it's obviously clear that clan and sub-clan based violence has made the country an anarchic state with no central authority for the last 25 years, scholars widely agree that Somalia’s internal problem is not clan structures rather it is clannism, the use of clan cover for political agenda. However, unfortunately, nowhere is mentioned the word “clannism” in CDRC’s report. 

As a way forward, the center urges the new administration to enhance the country’s federal structure and meet the concerns of different clans, especially the losers of the last election, to avoid another wave of clan sentiments. But, will the new administration has to enhance clannism ideology to avoid clan sentiments? Will it have to enforce the federal structure on the basis of clannism ideology that has sunk the nation in the past? Failure to answer such questions implies a desire to perpetuate the clannism ideology.  

In conclusion, CDRC’s argument that new admiration should build an effective cabinet, reinvigorate country’s institution, meet people’s demands, combat corruption, respond to the humanitarian crises caused by the drought and strengthen security by defeating Al-shabab to momentum the country’s revival journey are all valid and have a ring of truth. But, CDRC’s argument that clan diversities have been the cause of past problems and will pose a potential threat to the new administration and future nation rebuilding efforts is a mere fallacy and deserves the highest repudiation.  Because Somalia’s lack of strong central government for the last 25 years or any political turmoil since the nation’s independence had never been caused by clan diversities. But, as Sharmon Thomas states, Somalia’s weak central government had been laid down by western imperialism which divided the people and their land into different protectorate for the interest of colonial powers with defiance of local realities. Thus, the problem of division begins with the nation’s independence and was caused by foreign influence but not clan diversities. 

Furthermore, as Water Rodney a Pan-Africanist scholar contends, one of the causes Somalia’s endless instability is the “arduous job of building a democratic system out of authoritarian political culture inherited from colonial rule on the eve of independence.” Therefore, in order Somalia and country like it move from authoritarian political culture into a democratic and stable society, political transitional theorists argue country must pass a four consecutive stages, in which stage one is establishment of national identity, stage two is disappearing of internal hostilities, stage three is conflicting parts coming into a compromise and final stage which is normalization of democratic values exercised by a new generation of elites who have been inspired by their past ancestors. Accordingly, in the case of Somalia, there is obvious abnormality in the sequence of the stage and Scholars argue the sequence has been blocked by colonial legacies since colonialism had forcibly fenced the various precolonial family clans into a “single political entity.” As result clans see themselves as a nation and don’t want submit to a central government. Therefore, one cannot talk about Somalia’s clan dynamics and clan politics without understanding and acknowledging the impacts of colonial legacies. 

On the other hand, Somalia’s long-standing instability and lack of central government have never been in a vacuum and a result of only internal factors rather international and regional forces played their role in the game. Nevertheless, CDRC’s silence about the role of external forces in fueling Somalia’s conflicts raises concerns. As Sharmon Thomas’s research shows both American policies and neighboring countries’ influences have enhanced the colonial narratives of clan independence by giving every clan polity a national legitimacy.  Therefore, Somalia's clan politics have been a matter of external factor and remains to be the same. 

Finally, the center urges the new administration to establish a friendly relationship with the regional countries like Ethiopia and Kenya. But it doesn’t show any practical instructions to do so. Since both Ethiopia and Kenya control large territorial lands and people which originally belong to Somalia but taken on the principles of colonialism in the 19th century, it is hard to imagine any practical way that the current or any new administration can negotiate on to create a long-term win-win relationship for all parts. However, it is imperative that all countries denounce the colonial legacies and negotiate on the spirit of Pan-Africanism. As a result, since Ethiopia itself rebukes the 1929 Nile river agreement that gives Egypt a veto power over the use of Nile river water in the light of Pan-Africanism spirit, the same Pan-Africanism that Ethiopia appeals for the construction the renaissance dam must be imported to any negotiations or relations between Somalia on one side and Ethiopia and Kenya on the other hand.

Mohamed Garad is an independent researcher who studies the social, economic and political issues of horn of Africa.